November 19^th 1941:

What follows is a description of armoured tank combat such that we will likely see in Ariete when it the table. I thought that Barrie Pitt’s research here brought the typical action to light in a dramatic and factual manner.
– Auchinleck’s Command from the Crucible of War Trilogy.

Almost immediately after the action at Bir el Gubi, one of the first real tank battles between Panzer and modern Commonwealth tanks took place.

The results for both sides would be informative.

“Battlegroup Stephan, consisting of eighty-five mixed Panzers III and IV plus thirty-five Panzers II, complete with an artillery component of twelve 105mm. howitzers and four 88mm. flak or anti-tank guns, moved off shortly after midday and reached the area north-east of Gabr Saleh by 1430 to find the fifty Stuarts of 8th Hussars deploying rapidly to meet them.

What followed was the infinite confusion of the first purely panzer versus tank encounter on a large scale to take place in the desert, and it bore little relation to any previously held theories on armoured warfare. Instead of troops or squadrons manoeuvring together in mutually supporting teams, it became a frantic scurry of individual tanks fighting individual battles amid a cloud of sand and smoke, which blotted out visibility beyond a few yards and formed a choking fog illuminated sporadically by the flare of exploding ammunition and often by the flash of cannon much too near for comfort.

The Germans relied upon their drill and routine, the British upon the speed and manoeuvrability of their Honeys together with a certain native quickness of reaction, and during the battle no one could tell which combination was proving the more effective. The first charge of the Hussars took them clean through the German formation and they then turned and swept back in again in a manner reminiscent of the charge of the Heavy Brigade at Balaclava, the action being at such close range that the inadequacies of their main armament were unnoticeable.

An American observer of the battle (Colonel Bonner Fellers*, who had attached himself to XXX Corps Headquarters and was watching with considerable interest the performance of the Honeys) noted that the German anti-tank guns co-operated superbly on the flanks of their panzer columns, but were handicapped by the fog and confusion and suffered losses from the machine-guns of the marauding Hussars as these briefly emerged from the murk, and more later when the Honeys of 5th R.T.R., which had also been detached northwards after the K.D.G.s came hurrying back to join the battle.
It was all, as Alexander Clifford who was also watching it, commented:

‘utter, indescribable confusion’: There was something in it of a naval battle, something of a medieval cavalry charge, but all speeded up madly as you might speed up a cinema film… Inside that frantic jumble tanks were duelling with tanks in running, almost hand-to-hand fights, firing nearly point blank, twisting, dodging, sprinting with screaming treads and whining engines that rose to a shriek as they changed gear. As each new tank loomed up ahead gunners were swinging the muzzles of their guns automatically, eyes strained behind their goggles, fighting through the smoke and dust to discriminate friend from foe… Men told me afterwards that they were not even conscious of the two-pounders going off almost in their ears, so tense was their concentration. ”

But a strange incident towards the close of the battle served to highlight grave and significant deficiencies in the British approach to armoured warfare. Either as a result of wireless requests or of routine practice, a German petrol and ammunition column arrived on the horizon about an hour before sunset, and as if at a signal the panzers drew off and clustered around it like bees around a honey-pot; and the British could do nothing but stand and watch, for the German guns could pick Honeys off long before their own guns could register effectively.

As for the British artillery, it was too scattered, it took too long to get into action and out again – and it still lacked the spirit and training of close co-operation with armour. The battle was renewed briefly before sundown, but the two sides then drew apart, the Germans to remain on the battlefield (and thus to be able more easily to recover their damaged panzers) the British retiring.
They both claimed victory, and both overestimated the number of hostile tanks destroyed – the first example of a persistent habit which was to play havoc with operational planning on both sides for most of the campaign. ”

Result:
“Colonel Stephan claimed twenty-four Honeys destroyed and although this figure was close for Honeys knocked out, many had been towed away and were repaired and back in action within twenty-four hours, giving an actual loss to 4th Armoured Brigade of but eleven. The British claimed ‘between nineteen and twenty-six‘ panzers knocked out, but in fact Battlegroup Stephan left only two Panzer IIIs and one Panzer II wrecked on the battlefield, while their admirable recovery service took away four damaged Panzer IIIs, and any other damage was sufficiently slight either to be reparable by the crews or left until the battle was over.”

*Note it is Fellers reports like these which fell into Rommel’s hands and allowed him to know where the Commonwealth forces were, what strength they were at and what the plan was. Rommel or the Nazi apparatus had reports being copied by the stenography assistant/operator for a long time. The Brits finally worked it out, and Feller ended up being recalled! It was noticeable after that time that Rommel’s ‘insight, and intuition was not as ‘accurate’ going forward. Which has always made me wonder if Feller had not been compromised would the other commanders of the African forces for the Commonwealth have been relieved of duty?