First Man in Rome: Senatus Consultum Ultimum

STRATEGIKON SERIES · THIN RED LINE GAMES

SENATUS CONSULTUM ULTIMUM: the Rubicon month, 50/49 BC

Pictorial After Action Report ·

BigBoard Gaming · @wargamer · October 2026

GAME DETAILS

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HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Which month this is

The scenario booklet opens the game in January 49 BCE. The table calls the same turn November 50 BC. Errata already? -no silly….. The designer’s notes explain the gap: Pompey and the Senate believed they had months in hand because “Winter was approaching (the actual date was November 50 BC, since the Roman lunar calendar was roughly two months ahead), and it seemed unlikely that Caesar’s legions in Gaul would risk crossing the Alps” (Vianello, Designer Notes). The Landmark edition of Caesar gives its dates “of the traditional Roman civil calendar” (Landmark, note to Book 9). So the Senate’s January was a late-autumn month in real seasons, and an army that moved in it moved before anyone expected campaigning to begin. That gap is the first advantage the game hands Caesar.

Ten years in Gaul, and Conquest

By 50 BC Gaul was quiet. Goldsworthy writes that “there was no serious fighting and there was every indication that the series of devastating defeats inflicted on each rebellion had combined with the careful diplomatic efforts of the proconsul to create a stable new province” (Goldsworthy, Caesar, ch. XVII). Hirtius, writing the last book of the Gallic War, gives the same picture from Caesar’s side: the country was “exhausted after having lost so many battles, and the condition of subservience proved more advantageous” (Landmark 8.49).

The war had made Caesar rich, popular and hard to touch. He planned to stand for a second consulship in the autumn of 49 BC and take office in January 48. That would carry him straight from proconsular command into the consulship, so he never stood as a private citizen whom his enemies could prosecute for the controversies of 59 BC. A law passed by all ten tribunes in 52 BC let him stand without coming to Rome in person (Goldsworthy, ch. XVII; Landmark 8.50, note k: “Caesar was planning to run in 49 for the consulship of 48”).

The campaign to bring him home early

The attack began in 51 BC. The consul Marcus Claudius Marcellus argued that the victory over Vercingetorix had ended the Gallic war and that Caesar should be recalled. He failed, because Pompey would not back a recall before Caesar’s legal term had run out (Goldsworthy, ch. XVII; Landmark 8.53). Hirtius records that “a crowded Senate had voted the proposal down” (Landmark 8.53.1).

The year 50 BC turned on the tribune Gaius Scribonius Curio. Caesar had probably paid off his debts. Curio answered every motion against Caesar with one proposal: if Caesar must give up his army, so must Pompey. Hirtius quotes the terms: “both Caesar and Pompey should lay down their arms and disband their armies” (Landmark 8.52.4).

On 1 December the Senate voted on exactly that. Goldsworthy gives the count: “Only twenty-two senators voted against this, but no fewer than 370 backed it.” The consul Marcellus dismissed the House with “If that is what you want, be Caesar’s slaves!” and ignored the result (Goldsworthy, ch. XVII). The Landmark notes confirm a vote for joint disarmament that was “invalidated, however, by the consul’s veto” (Landmark, note 8.52n, citing Appian 2.30). Goldsworthy draws the conclusion: “nearly the entire Senate wanted peace above all else.” Syme reads the same vote as “nearly four hundred against twenty-two” and gives the moral in five words: “A rash and factious minority prevailed” (Syme, Roman Revolution, p. 47).

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Who the Optimates were

The faction across the table is not “the Senate”. Syme describes it as a coalition of four great houses joined to Cato’s following. There were Pompey’s father-in-law Metellus Scipio, two Lentuli and two Marcelli, Appius Claudius, “the symbol and link of the whole coalition”, and Cato’s kin Bibulus and Ahenobarbus. Ahenobarbus carried a grudge into the war, because “Caesar’s tenure of Gaul beyond the Alps robbed him of a province to which he asserted a hereditary claim” (Syme, pp. 43–45). His verdict: “It was the oligarchy of Sulla, manifest and menacing in its last bid for power, serried but insecure.” Pompey and his new allies distrusted each other: “Pompeius was playing a double game. He hoped to employ the leading nobiles to destroy Caesar… They were not duped—they knew Pompeius” (p. 45). On where the push came from, Syme is unequivocal: “The policy arose from the brain and will of Marcus Cato” (p. 46).

The game prints that mix on the Optimates setup. Pompey’s stack holds Cato (C1015). Enobarbus has his own command with the green legions (C1313). Lentulus sits apart with Rufus (C1012). Each leader is a separate counter, which matches Syme’s description of allies who did not trust one another.

Two legions taken from Caesar

Earlier in 50 BC the Senate had ordered one legion each from Pompey and Caesar for a war against Parthia. Hirtius says the arrangement was rigged from the start: “it was clear that both legions were going to be taken from only one of them,” because Pompey offered “the 1st Legion, which had been formed from a levy in Caesar’s province and he had lent to Caesar, as if it came from his own forces” (Landmark 8.54.1–2). Caesar complied, gave up the 15th as well, and sent the 13th into Cisalpine Gaul to replace it (Landmark 8.54.3).

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Goldsworthy adds that before releasing them Caesar paid each man 250 denarii, “a sum amounting to more than one year’s pay” (single source: Goldsworthy, ch. XVII).

The two legions never went east. When Caesar reached Cisalpine Gaul, he learned that “the two legions sent back by Caesar had been handed over to Gnaeus Pompey and kept in Italy” (Landmark 8.55.1). Syme confirms it: the legion Caesar gave up was withdrawn “along with another previously lent by Pompeius to Caesar. Both were retained in Italy” (Syme, p. 40). These are the veteran LEG I and LEG III in the Optimates setup.

Where Caesar’s army actually was

The game’s opening map rests on this. In autumn 50 BC Caesar did not concentrate his army. Hirtius places the winter quarters: “He stationed Gaius Trebonius with four legions in the territory of the Belgae and led Gaius Fabius, also with four, to the territory of the Aedui” (Landmark 8.54.4). Goldsworthy agrees that Caesar “had studiously avoided concentrating a field army lest his opponents use this as proof that he was seeking war”. South of the Alps there was only the 13th, with about 300 cavalry (Goldsworthy, ch. XVII).

Rumour did the rest. In October it was said in Rome that four legions were massing in Cisalpine Gaul. “In fact he had only one legion in the province, the Thirteenth” (Goldsworthy, ch. XVII). In early December a second report claimed Caesar had already invaded. It was false.

Labienus

Titus Labienus had been Caesar’s senior legate through all ten years in Gaul. In this scenario he starts on the Optimates side, under Pompey (scenario booklet §58.1, hex C0912), and the reason sits in this month. In the autumn of 50 BC, while Labienus was still Caesar’s man, Caesar made him his deputy in Cisalpine Gaul, partly to help his campaign for the consulship (Landmark 8.52.2). Caesar then heard “frequent reports that his enemies were seeking to win over Labienus,” but “did not believe anything that was said about Labienus” (Landmark 8.52.3). The Landmark editor adds: “We may doubt this. The relationship between Caesar and Labienus may have been troubled at this time” (note 8.52h). Syme goes further: “there was solid ground to doubt the loyalty of Caesar’s best marshal, T. Labienus.” He adds in a note that the expectation of his desertion was “probably an important factor” in the Optimates’ confidence (Syme, p. 42 and n. 6). Labienus went over in mid-January. Goldsworthy suggests he “may in fact have simply returned to an earlier loyalty, since he came from Picenum, a region dominated by Pompey’s family.” Caesar sent his baggage on after him (Goldsworthy, ch. XVIII).

The sword handed to Pompey

After the false invasion report, Marcellus went outside the city with the consuls-elect and “presented him with a sword and called on him to protect the Republic.” Pompey was given the two legions from Gaul and told to raise more. Goldsworthy is blunt: “None of this was legal, since the Senate had not approved the action or granted emergency powers” (Goldsworthy, ch. XVII). Syme tells the same scene. The consul “protested that Caesar was already invading Italy… Accompanied by the consuls-elect he went to Pompeius and handed him a sword, with dramatic gesture, bidding him take command of the armed forces in Italy” (Syme, p. 42). Pompey’s confidence came with it. He began to boast “that he had only to stamp his foot and armies would spring up from the soil of Italy” (Goldsworthy, ch. XVII). The scenario booklet opens on the same line: “Now, the time has come to test that claim.”

January: the decree and the river

On 1 January 49 the new consuls, both hostile to Caesar, let his letter be read but not debated (Landmark 9.1). Scipio’s motion carried: “Caesar should dismiss his army before a fixed date and that if he refused to do this, he would be judged to be planning treason against the state.” Antony and Quintus Cassius vetoed it (Landmark 9.2.6–7). Pompey called his veterans back to arms, and “the city and even the comitium were filled with military tribunes, centurions, and reenlisted men” (Landmark 9.3.3). Offers to send envoys to Caesar were all blocked by “the consul, Scipio, and Cato” (Landmark 9.4.1). Caesar’s private terms went as low as keeping only Cisalpine Gaul, “or even Illyricum, with a single legion” (Syme, p. 47 n. 2; Goldsworthy, ch. XVII gives the same offer). Syme does not treat them as a feint: the proposals “were moderate and may not be dismissed as mere manoeuvres for position or for time to bring up his armies” (p. 47).

On 7 January the Senate passed the senatus consultum ultimum, charging “the consuls, praetors and tribunes, and all the proconsuls near the city to ensure that the Republic comes to no harm” (Goldsworthy, ch. XVII; the scenario booklet quotes the same decree). Antony, Cassius and Curio fled north, disguised as slaves.

Caesar was at Ravenna with the 13th. He had already sent men in civilian clothes to take Ariminum. He spent the day watching gladiators, went to dinner, excused himself early and left in a hired carriage (Goldsworthy, ch. XVII; Vianello, Designer Notes, adds the baker’s mule cart). Goldsworthy’s verdict on the gamble: “he was embarking on a civil war when little more than a tenth of his forces were with him.”

What the game asks

Caesar’s own account plays all of this down. Vianello’s notes say so directly: “In his De Bello Civili, Caesar seeks to persuade the reader that his only aim was to avoid conflict… while carefully omitting any mention of the preparations he had in fact already made.” The designer reads it the other way: the arrival of more legions within days shows “that Caesar started his war preparations well in advance,” and “these historical facts are the basis for the dangerously weak Optimates setup.”

Syme describes what followed, and it reads like a debrief of the scenario’s opening. “Pompeius might stamp with his foot in the land of Italy, as he had rashly boasted. No armed legions rose at his call. Even Picenum, his own barony, went over to the enemy without a blow.” Pompey’s real plan was “no mere makeshift… but subtle and grandiose—to evacuate Italy, leaving Caesar entrapped between the legions of Spain and the hosts of all the East, and then to return, like Sulla, to victory and to power” (Syme, p. 49). Caesar “had only a legion to hand… But he swept down the eastern coast of Italy, gathering troops, momentum and confidence as he went” (p. 49).

So the opening turn asks whether Caesar can turn one legion and a head start into Italy before the Senate’s levies and Pompey’s two veteran legions become an army. It also asks whether the Optimates can hold anything in a month when, in the designer’s words, “city after city opened its gates to him” (Vianello, Designer Notes).

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CAMPAIGN STRATEGY

[KEV NOTE: Per the AAR rule, I don’t invent the courses of action. Fill in or dictate both halves. The T1-POP photo shows some intent (an “Army 4: Hold the Port” note on the Illyrian coast, and Caesar’s two-step move south), but not the plan behind it.]

Optimates COA (enemy) · [KEV NOTE: what Pompey’s side is likely to do, and where the levies and LEG I and III come from]

Populares COA (friendly) · [KEV NOTE: main effort, supporting effort, the decisive condition]

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SETUP — THE TABLE

Scenario I, the map area

The Scenario I playing area: Gallia Cisalpina, Italia, Illyricum and the islands. Gallia Transalpina, Macedonia and the Alps sit at the edges.

Caesar starts at C1009 by Ravenna, with Antony, Curio, Sulla and the 13th. The 12th is with Rebilus at C0608, and the 8th with Vatinius at C0209. On the Optimates side, Labienus is at C0912, Lentulus and Rufus at C1012, and Varus at 1211. Pompey, Cato and the consular party are at C1015. Enobarbus holds C1313 with the green IV and V legions. The two veteran legions taken from Caesar, I and III, are with Longus at C1916 (scenario booklet §§57.1, 58.1).

If you have followed along for any amount of time, you know I read designer notes first. Then Sequence of play. Then Rules. But once we get to Scenario time its victory conditions first. – What are they? Where are they? Who get points or success for what and when?

We have a short sharp brutal contest to run here. First Overall Commander [OC] dead loses. If not that then Caesar must controls Italia, Sicilia, Galacian Cisalpine AND…yes AND the Optimates morale is below 20 ANDthey have less than 30 size points of troops the Populares win….

The strategy then has to be twofold – for the Pompey kill. Same for the Optimates, but they just also need to keep on raising troops and not LOSING THEM. Which means avoid a fight? Just as historically, the Optimates can all flee the Italian peninsula and let Caesar control things. But he must still bring force to bear to reduce army sizes.

The table

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TURN 1 · NOVEMBER 50 BC (the scenario’s January 49 BCE) · Populares

Populares turn, 50 BC Nov.

The Populares turn as annotated. Caesar’s two-step move south from Ravenna (circled). “Mercs & Legions raised: 16 LG & 2 Merc.” “Forage taken” on the Tyrrhenian side. The Illyrian army is ordered to “Hold the Port.”

The annotated photo records the facts of the turn: XVI legion [ I actually think that its 12^th XII legion, my diagram is wrong, and the V – 5^th Legion also and 2 mercenary units raised, forage taken, and Caesar moved in two stages clearing off Optimates leaders and taking small towns. He ended in Acona area toward the Adriatic coast road. The armies in the north-west and on the Ligurian coast have moved, as the red dashed arrows show. Army 3 is the Cis-Alpine force that replaced the legions ‘taken’ from Caesar. Army 4, across the Adriatic on the Illyrian coast, is told to hold the port. Caesar places his self in Acona for two reasons.

Caesar on the coast below Ravenna with the Populares marker. The pen arrows trace the move.

Optimates commanders inland

Inland, Labienus, Rufus and Varus: the men Caesar’s advance has to go through or around. He goes through forcing leaders out of towns that can be used for raising troops. 5 units max per turn per city/location. I have been judging depletion of supply in Provinces incorrectly. I need to fix that for Caesars forces.

North-west

The north-west: Army 2 beside Placentia, the fleet off the Ligurian coast, Army 3 and Longinus to the south.

Legion experience roster

The legion experience roster as the new legions come in. Units start on the map but do not count for supply and cannot be moved until next recuitment phase.

Optimates · Nov 50 BC

Pompey moves south

The conundrum of the troop raising. Each area or province has its own max # of pts available to raise of certain types. Within Legions, Green Seasoned and Vets. In a 20-5-5 split or similar. Each Faction may in this scenario only raise a certain number of Legions.

The trick or problem is as these areas are limited to a certain draw down, it could or would be possible to ‘scorched earth’ the recruitment pool. At least up to the faction limits. Now that has its own built in issues and costs. But denying the enemy an army. That’s pretty cool. – I need to verify with TRL that is something ya could do.

Libo head to Sicilia to raise forces.

So Libo heads to Sicilia, but needs a ride over the water. And the Nasidus does the same. Locally a Legion is raised in Rome to defend her. Led by t. Labenius.

Actually a turn 2 shot of first Macedonian Legion to be raised. And Triremes and Heavy Cav secured also.

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CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT — END OF TURN 1

Measure against the history: in the real January, Ariminum fell without a fight, Pompey left Rome around the 17th, and Labienus defected mid-month (Goldsworthy, chs. XVII–XVIII). So a slightly different outcome.

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REFERENCE

Read the narrative version on Substack → bigboardgaming.substack.com