What follows is a preview of the Designers’ Notes for our upcoming First Man in Rome, to be released very soon. It is probably our most ambitious simulation to date, both in terms of its scope and the level of research and development it has required.

Beware! As usual, our print run is quite small, and most of the copies are already reserved. So, if you want to join the Legions and save the Republic, send a message to the Censor at info@TRLGames.com before it is too late!

COMMENTARIVS AVCTORIS
FABRIZIO VIANELLO SCRIPTVS

And here we are with the second book in the Strategikon series, whose undisputed protagonist is one of the greatest—if not the greatest—military mind of all time: Caius Iulius Caesar.

As you may recall from the designer’s notes to The Fate of All, I have had a deep interest and admiration for Alexander the Great since childhood. Damn, Alexander’s deeds and achievements are the stuff of legend, and even the darker sides of his character can be fascinating.

Caesar has a more subtle and complex appeal, and it took me a bit more maturity and study to fully appreciate his greatness. Whether the battlefield was the floor of the Roman Senate or a city in Gaul, Caesar’s extraordinarily sharp mind always found a way to victory, while at the same time composing accounts of events, and dispatching dozens of letters and orders to friends and enemies alike.

In this Commentarius Auctoris (also known in the barbarian lands as Designer’s Notes), I will not dwell on logistical problems or marching times, both of which have already been covered in The Fate of All parchments.

Instead, the goal here is to provide a quite detailed overview of the historical choices made and the political intricacies of the civil war. At the same time, the notes on grey background will give additional insight about the rules in First Man in Rome, and the reasons behind them.

The Fox and the Elephant – An Historical Analysis

Prelude

After ten years of successful campaigning in Gaul, Caesar had amassed an immense fortune and secured the unwavering loyalty of thousands of veteran legionaries.

With the death of Crassus at Carrhae, his only plausible rival was Cnaeus Pompeius Magnus, himself an extraordinarily wealthy and accomplished general. Like many senators, Pompey grew increasingly alarmed by Caesar’s rising power and influence.

In the end, he gradually aligned himself with the Senate, calling for Caesar to return to Rome as a private citizen, stripped of the Imperium that would protect him from prosecution and trial.

The Italian Campaign

In January 49 BC, the civil war between Caesar and the Roman Senate, led by Pompey, erupted. At first glance, the balance seemed heavily in favour of the Senate: it could rely on one of Rome’s most celebrated generals, thousands of veterans ready to be enlisted, and virtually all the resources of the Res Publica. The reality was different.

With the exception of two legions originally recruited by Caesar—and whose loyalty was uncertain—Pompey had no significant army in Italy. Nevertheless, he and the Senate believed they still had several months to prepare. Winter was approaching (the actual date was November 50 BC, since the Roman lunar calendar was roughly two months ahead), and it seemed unlikely that Caesar’s legions in Gaul would risk crossing the Alps. Consequently, several senators were dispatched to various Italian cities to raise troops, while newly appointed governors departed for their assigned provinces (See the initial setup for Scenario I – Senatus Consultum Ultimum).

In his De Bello Civili, Caesar seeks to persuade the reader that his only aim was to avoid conflict. He presents himself as having made no advance preparations for war and as continually hoping for a peaceful settlement, while carefully omitting any mention of the preparations he had in fact already made.

In reality, Caesar had begun moving months earlier, and his legions were already entering Italy at that very moment. To conceal his true intentions, he kept sending conciliatory letters to the Senate until the last moment. The day before crossing the Rubicon, he inspected the camp of the XIII Legion near Ravenna, attended a gladiatorial training session, and invited several guests to dinner. He then left earlier than usual, asking his guests to wait for his return.

In fact, some of his troops, dressed in civilian clothes, had already seized control of Ariminum (Rimini). During the night Caesar and a small group of attendants joined them, travelling in a mule-drawn carriage borrowed from a baker’s shop. The rest of the XIII Legion was only a few hours behind.

These historical facts are the basis for the dangerously weak Optimates setup at the beginning of the civil war. On the opposite front, the arrival in Italy of at least two additional Caesarian legions within a few days, described by the primary sources and supported by modern essays, bring to the conclusion that Caesar started his war preparations well in advance.

The result of these skillful opening moves was that the initial opposition to Caesar in Italy simply melted away. City after city opened its gates to him, while the inexperienced troops recruited by the Optimates deserted or joined Caesar’s army.

The only serious attempt at resistance was made at Corfinum by Lucius Domitius Enobarbus, an old enemy of Caesar. Ignoring Pompey’s orders to retreat south, Enobarbus mustered a force of roughly three legions—composed almost entirely of raw recruits—and prepared for a siege. Caesar, now commanding an army of four legions, arrived in February and began building a circumvallation to enclose the city.

As it became increasingly clear that no relief was coming, and that Enobarbus himself was planning to escape and leave the troops to their fate, the disaffected legionaries placed their commander under arrest and surrendered to Caesar.

As pointed out in the rules, only the Roman elite was truly interested in the outcome of the civil war and genuinely committed to one side or the other. For everyone else, it was just a question of surviving or gaining as much as possible in terms of wealth and social standing.

Consequently, the ruling class of most cities and the young recruits had little or no motivation to lose their homes or lives for a cause that wasn’t theirs. These events, and many others occurred during subsequent campaigns, brought to life the “City Surrender” and “The Fate of the Defenders” rules.

On this occasion Caesar made the first notable use of his famous Clementia: Both the enemy commanders and their troops were pardoned. The former Pompeian legionaries took an oath and entered Caesar’s service, while Enobarbus, driven by his hatred of Caesar, later rejoined Pompey.

In more than one occasion, legionaries did not simply surrender without fighting, but joined the former enemy’s army.

Once again, the primary considerations were survival and money. In one occurrence in Spain, the veteran Pompeian troops surrendered en masse, and also complained that they had not been paid. Incredible as it sounds, Caesar collected the money among his own legionaries, and used it to pay and enlist the former enemies in his army.

The Clementia rules and several event cards are directly inspired by these events.

The rest of the Italian campaign was practically uneventful. In March, Caesar had the full control of Italy, with Sicily and Sardinia shortly following. In the meantime, the Optimates had retreated into Macedonia, where Pompey hoped to finally mobilise an army able to face Caesar.

Both Sicilia and Sardinia were strategically important, as a significant part of the grain needed to feed Rome came from there. Without a steady grain supply, revolts and civil disorder were practically assured. The “Grain” rules cover these aspects.

The First Spanish Campaign

After securing Italy, Caesar faced threats on two fronts. To the east, Pompey controlled the sea and was assembling a powerful army in Macedonia. To the west, seven Pompeian legions in Spain threatened Caesar’s hold on Gaul and northern Italy.

Lacking the ships needed to cross the Adriatic, Caesar chose first to eliminate the Spanish armies. He therefore ordered Caius Fabius, with three legions in Gallia Transalpina, to secure the passes of the Pyrenees and contain the Pompeian forces.

Caesar left Rome in March 49 BC and by early May had reached Massilia, where his officers were besieging the city after it had declared for Pompey. Leaving the conduct of the siege to Caius Trebonius with three legions, he continued to Spain with three more, joining Caius Fabius in June.

In a disappointing show of lethargy, the seven Pompeian legions in Spain did almost nothing to attack the initially smaller army of Caius Fabius, or at least to prevent him to secure the mountain passes. Even after the arrival of Caesar, two of the seven legions sat idly in Hispania Ulterior, offering no assistance of any kind to the five facing the enemy.

The two armies camped near Ilerda, but aside from a few cavalry skirmishes little occurred before Caesar’s arrival. The Pompeians, commanded by Lucius Afranius, fielded five legions, about 10,000 cavalry, and at least an equal number of auxiliary infantry. Caesar now had six legions, probably around 6,000 cavalry, and some 5,000 auxiliary infantry.

A series of manoeuvres, countermanoeuvers, and minor clashes followed. Meanwhile, the Pompeians’ supply situation worsened by the day, while Caesar deliberately avoided a pitched battle, hoping to secure another relatively easy victory. Eventually, Pompeian morale began to crumble, and Afranius chose to surrender. Once again, Caesar showed Clementia, enrolled the best soldiers into his own ranks, and allowed the rest to return home.

When news of Afranius’s defeat reached Hispania Ulterior, the two remaining Pompeian legions there, under Marcus Terentius Varro, also surrendered without having drawn their swords even once.

By the end of August, the Pompeian resistance in Spain was over. Shortly thereafter, even the city of Massilia decided to surrender.

The disconcerting conduct of the Optimates during the campaign—their passivity and eventual mass surrender—was probably the result of several unfavourable factors.

First, Caesar moved with his usual extraordinary speed, and news of his movements likely preceded him by only a few days or weeks. As far as Afranius and Varro knew, Caesar and his army were still in southern Italy in March; seeing him appear in Spain leading six legions in early June must have come as a considerable shock.

Second, Pompey’s last instructions had been to defend Spain. His commanders followed these orders rigidly, lacking either the information or the strategic instinct to recognise that the situation was rapidly evolving and demanded a more proactive response.

Finally, it cannot be ruled out that their willingness to fight and risk their lives was limited.

There is no guarantee here that the same chain of misfortune will recur, even though the possibility remains. The “Changing Winds” rule, combined with the optional “Varro” rule and some event card at the wrong moment, may bring the war in Spain to a similar conclusion.

In any case, it would be very difficult for the Optimates to perform worse than their historical counterpart.

The Macedonian Campaign

In November or December 49 BC, Caesar was back to Rome to arrange his election to Consul. Meanwhile, the army was instructed to concentrate at Brundisium, to prepare the crossing of the Adriatic and the clash with Pompey.

On the other side of the Adriatic, Pompey had the complete control of the sea, having assembled a fleet of more than four hundred warships. His army, mostly recruited in the eastern provinces and client states, now amounted to nine legions, seven thousand cavalry, and probably the same number of auxiliary infantry. Two additional legions were in Syria and expected to reach Macedonia within a few months.

Caesar had approximately twelve under-strength legions in Italy, but he was not able to gather enough transport ships for all of them. Moreover, his army was dangerously short of cavalry compared to the enemy.

The forces of the Roman client states, fully covered by the rules of the same name, were an important contribution to a Roman army particularly regarding cavalry and auxiliary troops.

Historically, all the client states initially sided with Pompey or remained neutral. When it became clear that Caesar was having the upper hand, most of them quickly switched allegiance. The “Changing Winds” rule has its roots in these events.

In January 48 BC, as winter was approaching (Remember, it’s actually November), Pompey followed the military tradition and moved his army and fleet to the winter quarters, counting on the fact that the enemy would not dare crossing during the bad season.

Once again, Caesar relied on the element of surprise and took one of the biggest risks of his career: He crossed the Adriatic with only seven under-strength legions, practically no cavalry, and during the storms season. Once again, the gamble paid off: When the Pompeians realised they have been tricked, Caesar’s army was already in Macedonia. The two armies now engaged in a run for Dyracchium, the main supply base of the Optimates, and Pompey was able to reach and secure it first.

The months from November to February were traditionally named “Mare Clausum” (Closed Sea) as navigation was considered unsafe due to storms and poor visibility. This is covered by the “Stormy Sea” rules, making even a short crossing risky, and by a reduced chance of reacting to enemy moves during these months.

Unable to seize Dyrrachium and outnumbered, Caesar decided to withdraw to Apollonia and wait for Mark Antony to bring reinforcements from Italy. Pompey, for his part, also chose to avoid a pitched battle and instead keep Caesar contained, relying on his naval superiority to cut off Caesar’s supplies and starve his army into submission.

The standoff continued for some time, with Caesar growing increasingly desperate as the weeks passed. Finally, in April (actually February), Mark Antony eluded the enemy fleet by repeating the hazardous crossing of the Adriatic during winter, and landed north of Dyrrachium with four legions and additional cavalry.

Now faced with a second enemy force to the north, Pompey moved to Dyrrachium to secure his last remaining port on the western coast of Macedonia. An attempt to lure Mark Antony into an ambush failed, and Caesar and Antony were soon able to unite their forces.

With the opposing armies encamped near Dyrrachium, both sides began constructing extensive lines of fortifications stretching for several miles: Caesar aimed to pin Pompey against the coast, while Pompey built counter-works to prevent this. This unusual contest of engineering continued until June (April), when Pompey finally broke the siege with a frontal assault coordinated with an amphibious landing on the outer side of Caesar’s fortified line.

By encircling the enemy at Dyrrachium, Caesar aimed to restrict Pompey’s movements and limit his ability to forage in the surrounding countryside. There was, however, an even more important reason: Since Caesar’s army could not be supplied by sea, the fortified line also served to shield his own foraging parties — the army’s only reliable source of provisions — from the numerically superior Pompeian cavalry.

This kind of strategy and its effects are replicated by the Foraging, Siege, and Vallum rules.

With his attempt to keep Pompey encircled having failed, and with news that two additional enemy legions from Syria were approaching, Caesar managed to withdraw and move toward Thessaly. Pompey shadowed his movements but continued to avoid a decisive engagement. Eventually the two Syrian legions joined Pompey, and the opposing armies met again in August (June) 48 BC at Pharsalus.

By that time, most of the senators in the Optimates camp were convinced that, after the incomplete but nonetheless significant success at Dyrrachium, the moment had come to finish off Caesar. In the end, Pompey was compelled, whether by pressure or persuasion, to abandon his strategy of attrition and accept battle.

Caesar was able to field approximately 25,000 legionaries, 1,000 cavalry and maybe 3,000 auxiliary infantry. On the opposite side, Pompey led an army of probably 45,000 legionaries, 7,000 cavalry, and thousands of auxiliary troops.

Pompey had a vast numerical advantage, but most of his troops were recruits with little or no combat experience. On the contrary, Caesar’s army was formed almost exclusively by combat veterans with years of experience in Gallia.

The battle was decided when the main body of Pompey’s cavalry, deployed on the left flank, charged the enemy cavalry, only to discover that Caesar had hidden behind it a consistent force of legionary infantry. A similar tactic had been used by Alexander at the battle of Gaugamela, with similar results: entangled and disordered by the unexpected infantry counterattack, the inexperienced Pompeian cavalry routed, sealing the fate of the rest of the army.

Pompey fully understood that his green troops were no match for Caesar’s veteran legions, and pursued an attritional strategy for as long as possible. In the end, he was compelled to abandon it, either by unfolding events or pressure from his allies, with disastrous consequences.

The Experience rule captures this crucial dynamic: A well-led veteran legion could often face and defeat a larger force of inexperienced recruits.

Egypt and the East

After the defeat at Pharsalus, the remnants of the Optimates faction dispersed, seeking refuge in the provinces of Africa and Hispania.

Pompey chose to flee to Egypt, likely hoping to cash in on old favours and collect the substantial debt owed by the Ptolemaic dynasty to Rome. It proved to be a fatal miscalculation.

Egypt was already on the brink of dynastic conflict between Cleopatra VII and her brother, Ptolemy XIII. Determined to secure his position, Ptolemy and his advisers chose to align themselves with Caesar, calculating that eliminating Pompey would win his favour and ensure Cleopatra’s removal. When Pompey arrived at Pelusium, he was met by one of his former centurions, acting on Ptolemy’s orders, who stabbed him and then had him decapitated.

Caesar arrived in Alexandria just a few days later, in October 48 BC, accompanied by about two thousand legionaries, and was presented with Pompey’s severed head. The gruesome gift failed to achieve its intended effect: contrary to Ptolemy’s expectations, Caesar declared that Egypt should be ruled jointly by Cleopatra and Ptolemy, and also demanded repayment of the ten million Denarii owed to Rome.

It was the spark for open war. Ptolemy and his courtesans mobilised the population and the army, and besieged Caesar and Cleopatra in the royal palace. Caesar’s troops stood fast, and after several naval and land skirmishes reinforcements arrived from the province of Asia and from Antipater I of Iudaea. In the following battle of the Nile, the Egyptian army was decisively defeated, and Ptolemy drowned in the river while attempting to escape.

Replicating the events in Egypt was definitely one of the most complex challenges: A client state that initially sided with one faction, switched allegiance later, then turned into an enemy power, and finally returned to be a client state.

As for the events in Spain, nothing is scripted or bound to happen, but the possibility is there. A military defeat could activate the “Changing Winds” rule, a desperate Pompey could demand a large tribute and trigger a change of alignment, the “Isis and Osiris” event card could ignite the Egyptian civil war. Only the Gods know.

With Egypt and its vital grain supply securely under his control, Caesar allowed himself a brief respite with Cleopatra before turning to the next crisis: Pharnaces II, king of the Bosporus.

The son of the legendary Mithridates Eupator, Pharnaces had taken advantage of the Roman civil war to reclaim his father’s former domains. A Roman force under Cnaeus Domitius Calvinus had been defeated in December 48 BC, and Pharnaces was now advancing through Asia Minor.

Caesar arrived in Cappadocia during the summer with an army composed of the veteran Sixth Legion, the remnants of Calvinus’ defeated force, and locally raised troops. In August 47 BC the two armies met at Zela. A final attempt by Pharnaces to negotiate a formal peace was rejected, and in the ensuing battle the king of the Bosporus was decisively routed.

Several hostile powers could have played a role in the civil war and are represented, from the barbarian tribes of Britannia to the feared cavalry armies of Parthia.

Generally speaking, each power could sooner or later decide to attack the Roman territory, depending by how strongly its own area of interest is garrisoned, both by Roman and client states forces.

The Final Chapters

In the meantime, the Optimates faction had somehow regrouped in Africa, bringing together local troops and survivors of the previous campaigns in Spain and Macedonia. In total, they were able to muster 10 legions, 2,000 cavalry, and 80 elephants, under the command of Cecilius Metellus Scipio.

King Juba of Numidia, having an old grudge with Caesar, was also a staunch supporter of the Optimates since the beginning of the civil war. He added his considerable army of 4 “legions” armed in Roman style, 10,000 cavalry, 40 elephants, and several thousands of auxiliary troops.

Caesar was back in Italy in late September, 47 BC. A half-hearted mutiny by some of his troops was quickly resolved, and much needed extra money was collected by taking loans or asking for “voluntary donations” from client states, free cities, and Roman provinces.

Money was a constant problem for both factions, and contribution or loans were often asked to client kingdoms, free cities, and Roman provinces. Caesar in particular was well-known for making a liberal use of loans from friends and supporters of any kind.

The Loans, Client Tribute, and City Tribute rules all take inspiration from this practice. Selling the enemies as slaves is also an option, as long as they are not Roman citizens; Caesar made a lot of money that way (See the “Clementia on Troops” rules).

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In December 47 BC (Again, actually October) Caesar joined the army stationed in Sicily, and set off for Africa. The crossing did not go particularly well, and some additional days were spent to regroup the scattered fleet. In the end, Caesar established his camp at Ruspina, near the modern Monastir, with an army of approximately 30,000 men.

A first clash between a strong foraging party led by Caesar himself and a cavalry force led by his old commander Titus Labienus almost turned into a disaster for Caesar, as the Numidian cavalry encircled his army and forced him to conduct a dangerous fighting withdrawal back to the fortified camp of Ruspina.

During the following weeks, Scipio and King Juba joined Labienus, while Caesar kept receiving additional troops from Sicily. By March 46 BC, Caesar probably had 10 legions, 4,000 cavalry, and 2,000 or more auxiliary troops.

As usual, Caesar’s main problem was the cavalry superiority of the enemy, so he conceived a plan to fight a battle where the Numidian cavalry could not spread out. In April, he moved toward Thapsus, the main Pompeian supply base, approaching from a two-miles corridor between the sea and a lake.

The Pompeians could not afford to lose Thapsus and followed. Seeing a chance to surround Caesar, they split their army: Scipio moved in from the north end of the lake, leaving Labienus and Juba on the south end.

It was exactly what Caesar hoped. He quickly moved against Scipio’s army and routed it, then turned to Juba and Labienus, only to find that most of their army had already fled. The remaining enemy legionaries tried to surrender, but Caesar was apparently unable to stop the blood lust of his troops who proceeded to slaughter them.

Once again, an ingenuous plan, helped by the enemy lacklustre approach, allowed Caesar to obtain victory.

The “Battlefield Setup” rules allows to replicate the situation, but it will be probably harder to lure into the same trap an enemy knowing a little of history.

In the aftermath, Scipio and King Juba committed suicide, followed shortly by Cato, commanding the fugitives at Utica. Once again, Labienus was able to escape.

Needless to say, the “Dignitas in Death” rule takes origin from this and many similar historical examples.

With Africa secured, Caesar returned to Rome. He spent several months consolidating his position as de facto ruler, celebrating his long-awaited triumphs, and introducing a series of reforms—most notably the Julian calendar, which finally brought the official date into line with the seasons.

No matter how favourable the military situation, Roman politics could not be ignored. The inner workings of the Res Publica were notoriously complex, inefficient, and riddled with obstacles. Even a single, determined Tribune of the People could obstruct or paralyse nearly any initiative, regardless of the power behind it.

Marcus Porcius Cato was the clearest example: for years, he managed to thwart the plans of Rome’s most powerful men, acting almost alone and relying largely on his authority and reputation.

This fragile balance is reflected in the “Forum Control” rule, which requires the faction controlling Rome to keep its leader in the capital long enough to consolidate power, or risk unrest in the city and the provinces.

Meanwhile, the last remnants of the Optimates, under the command of Cnaeus Pompeius, were regrouping in Spain.

One of Caesar’s governors there, Quintus Cassius Longinus, proved a disastrous choice: his corruption and rapacity exceeded even Roman standards.

In 47 BC, after months of exactions and unpaid wages, both the local population and the legionaries in Hispania Ulterior revolted. Three legions defected to the Pompeians, giving Cnaeus Pompeius a solid foundation on which to rebuild an army. Longinus attempted to flee by sea with his plunder, only to drown at the mouth of the Ebro.

These events inspired the “Carnifex Provinciae” card, representing the risk that a faction lacking firm control over elections and the Senate may end up appointing deeply unsuitable governors, with potentially disastrous consequences.

Caesar initially dispatched Caius Trebonius to replace Longinus, hoping local forces could restore order and defeat the Pompeians. By November 46 BC, however, with Cnaeus Pompeius commanding an army of thirteen legions and controlling most of Spain, it was clear the situation had slipped out of control. Caesar set out once more, with an initial force of five legions.

Caesar arrived in Spain in December 46 BC (October by the traditional Roman calendar) and advanced toward Corduba, where the army of Cnaeus Pompeius had established its main base.

The campaign unfolded cautiously, with Cnaeus avoiding a decisive engagement and gradually withdrawing into the mountainous region to the southwest. In the end, however, desertions and declining morale forced him to accept battle near Munda in March 45 BC.

The Pompeian army took up a strong position on rising ground in front of Munda, while Caesar’s legions deployed at the foot of the hills. Then, almost without warning, both lines surged forward and clashed.

The battle raged for hours, with the Pompeians slowly gaining the upper hand. As his line began to falter, Caesar removed his helmet, seized a shield, and rushed to the front ranks, shouting like a madman.

His personal intervention steadied the line and revived the soldiers’ morale, and the Caesarians gradually pushed the enemy back. Cnaeus’ army first attempted an orderly withdrawal, but soon collapsed into a rout. As at Thapsus, Caesar’s troops appear to have lost control in the aftermath, cutting down any enemy who failed to escape in time.

During the late Republic, there are very few documented cases of Roman generals fighting in first line. The “Heroic Leadership” optional rule has been left in place thanks to this episode.

The civil war was finally over, and Caesar stood unchallenged as the first man in Rome. Unfortunately, he would enjoy his supremacy for little more than a year.

Conclusions

Entire armies surrendering without a fight, or switching sides outright. Walled cities opening their gates first to one army, then to another. Client kings fighting for one faction, only to seek pardon and readily join the other.

During the Roman civil war, politics and warfare intertwined in a way rarely seen before. Events are often difficult to understand, and at times even to believe, without considering the political context and the competing interests at stake.

For this reason, First Man in Rome features a strong political layer, allowing for the possibility—but never the certainty—of the same historical events to happen, and for events that never happened to materialise. Almost nothing is scripted, yet all the elements are there, lurking in the dark and waiting for the wrong move.

As a result, any commander approaching the conflict expecting history to repeat itself is likely in for an unpleasant surprise. To become the first man in Rome, you must observe, adapt, and survive.

COMMENTARIVS ARTIFICIS
ANTONY MORPHET SCRIPTVS

As Fabrizio has abandoned the traditional form of describing rules gestation and instead has used the medium of historical description to inform the reader of his conceptual sources, it falls to me to add a little detail for those who like to peruse the nitty gritties.

Design Philosophy

Why am I talking about the design philosophy surely that is Fabrizio’s purview? It is, but it is also the golden thread that runs through all TRL games and the decisions taken in support of both rules design and development.

I feel it is appropriate to reiterate that our overriding intention is to give the player the ability to make the grand decisions of the Commander of the time within the constraints he had to work under.

Hence we are not writing a simulation of the history of the civil war but hopefully a game that simulates the political, economic and military conditions of the time accurately reflecting the restrictions facing the two great personages of Caesar and Pompey.

The players should not be constrained by rules that encourage or even force the “historical solution” but empowered to make and take their own decisions within the art of the historically possible. That is what we believed we achieved for Alexander and Darius in The Fate of All (TFOA).

This game is the second in the Strategikon series after TFOA and has the same design philosophy. Therefore it was originally supposed to use the same rules with a few small tweaks to accommodate tactics development and the like.

In reality over two years have gone into this project, encompassing a major rewrite of the rules, although for those TFOA veterans they will feel very similar and very comfortable. How and why was that?

The Interplay between Concepts and Nitty Gritty Design Decisions (The Rule of Consequences)

In the next couple of paragraphs I shall endeavour to illustrate how a tweak to a rule from TFOA to accommodate a changed concept could have major implications for the rules in First Man in Rome.

1. Scope – Map Size

The first discussions were about the potential scope of the game. It struck us both that although the entire Roman world was suffering under the convulsions of a civil war the implications were also huge for the near neighbours; be they client states or foreign powers and civilised or barbarian.

The Romans were lucky that in those 5 years of war only a few potential adversaries took significant advantage of Roman introspection to push their own agendas – it could have been so much worse. Once the dust of research and discussion and argument had settled it became abundantly clear that the map had to include not just the actual areas fought over by the Roman protagonists but potentially the British Isles in the north-west and Parthia in the south-east.

The resulting map had huge implications for the game. If we were to retain the 30km hex system; the 4 map game that was TFOA would be at least 8 and conceivably as many as 12 maps for this creation. Even for us too big!

Could we use an LOC system and individual theatre maps? Not unless we were going to force the game to slavishly follow real history which, as described above, is not really how we like our games!

2. Map Size to Hex Size – So What.

The alternative was to double the hex size to 60km which was the design decision made. At which point the potentially huge second and third order implications for the logistics, movement and fatigue concepts became apparent.

3. Practical Romans!

Thinking, researching hard, discussing and arguing about the effect of doubling the hex size led to looking in depth at the Roman approach to logistics, movement and the like.

Would the rules used in TFOA stand up to Romanisation? The first question I asked myself was probably “what are the Romans famous for?” The answer is easy – many, many things but amongst the top ten are roads, canals and just in time logistics for both their armies and their cities.

Consular roads outside of Roman core territories were easy, improve the TFOA King’s Road. However what about the plethora of secondary roads within greater Italia? Surely everything was faster there as well.

In the end we decided that the goods moving faster meant the provincial areas were logistically more viable for forces moving through them. So in the end after a little tinkering the fundamental TFOA rules still worked.

4. Mare Nostrum

Inevitably some of the longer rules discussions and a large amount of research went into naval movement and warfare. This is considerably more important to the Roman Republic than it ever was to Alexander or Darius.

After much research, discussion and testing; navies are both more powerful and manoeuvrable in Roman times but they are still at the mercy of Poseidon and his cohorts, particularly in winter. A foolish man who relies on the navy in winter – Gaius Julius.

5. Roman Military System

Veterans or untrained, citizen soldiers or levies, morally steadfast or mildly mutinous? Capable of learning and developing or set in their ways? Loyal to the state or an individual? Prowess in battle is always predetermined?

The Roman legionary can be all of those and he also has a fighting style unknown before and rarely copied since. A mobile block of heavily armoured swordsmen rather than spearmen. Theoretically recruited for a campaign but often practically for life, legionary recruitment, training and retention are the basis of any victory. The rules for legionaries on and off the battlefield reflect that and make their troop type quite, quite unique.

6. Politics

At its heart TFOA is a simple game of two autocratic rulers fighting a war of survival. There are very few external political factors and it is unlikely that a satrapy defecting from Darius to Alexander will change the course of the war.

Two centuries later and in the centre of the Roman world, life is fundamentally different. Learning how to use the various political layers in the game from maintaining clients through winning over client states and free cities will be at the heart of your developing winning strategy, particularly in the full campaign.

It is worth noting that you can beat your opponent and be the sole controller of the Roman Republic, yet still lose the game if you have cost Rome too much blood and treasure and particularly if you lose her provinces and possessions. To truly win, Rome needs to be more powerful at the end of the war than she was at the beginning and you have to own Rome.

Summary

So how do you win? Simple really!

You have to be aggressive but not destructive. You have to beat but not necessarily kill your enemies. You have to maintain the awe and fear instilled in your neighbours in order to maintain your borders with the minimum use of resources.

Overall you need to maintain or even increase your dignitas and auctoritas in the eyes of your opponents, both physical and fantastical.

Finally

Taking note of the design and development process and now returning to Fabrizio’s historical discourse and deductions for rule writing you will note that the resulting game, which you hold in your hands demonstrates three things: Firstly; just how lucky Caesar was, secondly that everything is possible in this game giving it ultimate replayability, and finally how potentially difficult it might be to gain an acceptable historical win – even if you do nominally win the game.